Hand in hand: Public endorsement of climate change mitigation and adaptation by Brügger, A et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Hand in Hand: Public Endorsement of Climate
Change Mitigation and Adaptation
Adrian Brügger1,2*, Thomas A. Morton2, Suraje Dessai3,4
1 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, 2 College of
Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom, 3 Sustainability Research
Institute and ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, School of Earth and Environment,
University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom, 4 Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation
Research Group, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
* adrian.bruegger@imu.unibe.ch
Abstract
This research investigated how an individual’s endorsements of mitigation and adaptation
relate to each other, and how well each of these can be accounted for by relevant social
psychological factors. Based on survey data from two European convenience samples
(N = 616 / 309) we found that public endorsements of mitigation and adaptation are strongly
associated: Someone who is willing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation) is
also willing to prepare for climate change impacts (adaptation). Moreover, people endorsed
the two response strategies for similar reasons: People who believe that climate change is
real and dangerous, who have positive attitudes about protecting the environment and the
climate, and who perceive climate change as a risk, are willing to respond to climate
change. Furthermore, distinguishing between (spatially) proximal and distant risk percep-
tions suggested that the idea of portraying climate change as a proximal (i.e., local) threat
might indeed be effective in promoting personal actions. However, to gain endorsement of
broader societal initiatives such as policy support, it seems advisable to turn to the distant
risks of climate change. The notion that “localising” climate change might not be the pana-
cea for engaging people in this domain is discussed in regard to previous theory and
research.
Introduction
To respond to the challenges posed by climate change, societies around the world are faced
with two related but separate strategies. The first strategy,mitigation, involves reducing the
magnitude of future climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., reduction of en-
ergy consumption) and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks (e.g., afforestation) [1]. However, be-
cause the planet is already committed to a certain level of climate change [2], it is also
important to prepare for and deal with the negative consequences of climate change (e.g., pro-
tecting coastal zones from sea-level rise) as well as taking advantage of the positive
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consequences of climate change (e.g., growing wine in regions that were previously too cold for
that purpose). This second response to climate change is referred to as adaptation [2].
Implementing these response strategies, however, is challenging not least because it requires
endorsement from the general public. If public endorsement is weak and priorities lie else-
where, then unpopular mitigation and adaptation measures will meet resistance. Understand-
ing how members of the public view mitigation and adaptation is also important because the
amount of individuals’ greenhouse gas emissions—and therefore the potential for emission re-
ductions— is substantial [3]. Individual motivation is also paramount in terms of adaptation:
the responsibility for many adaptive responses entirely lies with individuals. In short, if mitiga-
tion and adaptation are to be successful, both as individual and collective (i.e., policy) re-
sponses, it is important to understand what motivates people to endorse each of
these strategies.
While climate change experts agree that both mitigation and adaptation are necessary, cur-
rently there is little knowledge about the relationship between people’s endorsement of mitiga-
tion and their endorsement of adaptation. Conceptually, three relationships between
mitigation and adaptation can be postulated: (1) a negative relationship, where the public con-
siders mitigation and adaptation as competing alternatives—that is, people favour either miti-
gation or adaptation and discard the other; (2) a positive relationship, where people similarly
endorse (or oppose) mitigation and adaptation, or; (3) there is no systematic relationship be-
tween endorsements for mitigation and adaptation.
The first possibility, a negative relationship between the two response strategies, mirrors
how interest in mitigation and adaptation developed over time. Until recently, researchers and
policy-makers almost exclusively focused on mitigation [4,5]. One of the reasons for the priori-
tising of mitigation was that focusing on adaptation evoked negative associations such as being
“defeatist” or not willing to act [5]. Members of the public might take a similar stance and fa-
vour mitigation over adaptation.
In addition to the historical development, there are important differences between mitiga-
tion and adaptation that, on their own, could create a divide between endorsements of the two
response strategies. The most striking difference is probably the temporal and spatial scale at
which the two strategies work [4,6]. Mitigation requires immediate action but—due to the iner-
tia of the climate system—it will take decades before mitigation efforts will show their benefits.
To illustrate, it would take several decades before emission reductions stabilised the climatic
changes that are already under way. In contrast, adaptation measures typically focus on short
or medium term problems and often yield immediate benefits. An example that illustrates this
is the upgrade of flood defences: once they are in place, they protect people to a higher standard
of flood risk. With regard to space, effective mitigation must be implemented globally and will
also have global benefits while adaptation efforts and benefits are constrained to the regional or
local level [4]. There are a number of individual differences that could lead people to more
strongly support early versus late action or (spatially) proximal versus distant solutions (e.g.,
the extent to which people are attached to proximal versus distant places [7]).
Despite the historical development and incontestable differences between mitigation and
adaptation, a positive relationship, that is, joint endorsement of (or opposition to) the two strat-
egies, is not implausible. After all, their common goal is to avoid negative consequences for the
human and natural environment. If people’s endorsements of mitigation and adaptation are
guided by a broader perspective that integrates both strategies as a common response to threats
associated with climate change, then people who endorse one strategy, for example because
they value nature, should also endorse the second strategy.
Lastly, there are at least two reasons why the relationship between mitigation and adaptation
may be unsystematic. First, the media typically frame climate change mitigation and adaptation
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independently of each other [8]. This makes it difficult for laypeople to relate the two strategies
to each other, other than via their common association with the issue of climate change. Sec-
ond, it is possible that the way different people relate mitigation to adaptation varies strongly
(e.g., some people may endorse both strategies because of their common goal, others favouring
one strategy because of its specific characteristics). In this case the pattern between the two
strategies could look unsystematic (i.e., zero-relationship). In sum, good reasons can be ad-
vanced for a negative, positive, or unsystematic relationship between mitigation
and adaptation.
To date, few studies have empirically investigated the relationship between mitigation and
adaptation in the public’s mind. Among these studies, two provide indirect evidence for a posi-
tive relationship: Farmers who believed that anthropogenic climate change was happening
were more likely to endorse mitigation and adaptation measures than farmers who were scepti-
cal about climate change [9]. It is, however, unclear to what extent these results apply to the
general public. Yet a study conducted among homeowners—who may be more comparable to
the general public—revealed similar findings: The more homeowners were aware of and con-
cerned about climate change, the more money were they willing to pay for mitigation and ad-
aptation measures [10]. Another study conducted with members of the general public found
that the more people felt that climate change was a severe threat and the more they felt vulnera-
ble, the more they were willing to mitigate [11]. However, severity and vulnerability did not
predict adaptation, suggesting that people endorsed the two strategies for different reasons and
that the relationship between mitigation and adaptation may be unsystematic. Overall, previ-
ous studies provide some evidence that specific groups (i.e., farmers and homeowners) endorse
mitigation and adaptation strategies for similar reasons. However, very little is known about
how the general public relates these two strategies to each other.
Against this backdrop, the aim of the present research is to further explore the relationship
between endorsements of mitigation and adaptation by examining the correlations between
different forms of mitigation and adaptation and by investigating people’s motives to mitigate
and to adapt. To this end, we draw on a range of specific motivational variables that have been
identified in previous research on individual responses to climate change.
Individual’s Motivation to Endorse Mitigation and Adaptation
Climate change scepticism
One factor that is crucial for people’smotivation to mitigate climate change is the extent to
which people believe or doubt that climate change is real and will have serious effects. If people
are sceptical about climate change, it is unlikely that they will act upon it. In line with this rea-
soning, some studies showed that higher levels of scepticism are associated with lower levels of
endorsement of mitigation [9,12]. Others, however, have found no relationship between scepti-
cism and mitigation [13,14].
There is some evidence that people low in scepticism are more likely to take actions to adapt
to climate change than those high in scepticism [9,15]. However, it is also plausible that people
who are sceptical about the reality and relevance of climate change may endorse adaptation
measures. More specifically, if adaptation is understood as a possible future alternative to costly
and unnecessary (from a sceptical point of view) mitigation efforts in the present, endorsing
adaptation is an excuse for not taking any mitigation actions now [16–18] (see also [19]). In
other words, it is possible that climate change sceptics favour adaptation over mitigation be-
cause it allows them to stall and block mitigation efforts.
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Attitudes
Until recently, climate change has almost exclusively been framed as an environmental prob-
lem [20]. Correspondingly, the general population is well aware that climate change will harm
the environment [21] and their attitude towards nature and its protection should play some
role in accounting for individual differences in mitigating climate change. Previous research
confirms that people with strong pro-environmental attitudes are more likely to mitigate cli-
mate change [22,23]. Given that people who positively evaluate environmental protection usu-
ally also hold positive attitudes towards nature in general [24], we expect the relationship
between attitude towards nature and endorsement of mitigation to be positive too.
Because adaptation has multiple foci—for example, maintaining human safety—the specific
goal of protecting the environment is less prominent for this action than for mitigation [2]. In-
deed, adaptive responses can, sometimes, entail actively changing the environment (e.g., con-
struction of sea dikes to protect inhabited areas from future sea-level rise). We therefore
assume that attitude towards nature and attitude towards environmental protection will be
positively related to endorsement of adaptation, but not as strongly as these attitudes are relat-
ed to endorsement of mitigation.
Risk perceptions
Another important requisite for acting on a threat is the extent to which people feel at risk.
Risks can be processed in two different ways: Analytically or affectively. The analytical process-
ing mode is thought to be slow and deliberative. It deals with abstract symbols and numbers
and is used to think about the future or hypothetical events. The affective processing mode, on
the other hand, is fast and does not need any conscious effort. It relies on intuition, experiences,
images, and associations [25]. Importantly, the two processing modes are not independent of
each other. They work in parallel and influence our behaviour in conjunction with our deci-
sions [26].
When used to explain people’s endorsement ofmitigation, both analytic and affective ap-
praisals of risks have been found to be reliable predictors: The more people considered climate
change as a risk and the more negative feelings they had about it, the more they were willing to
mitigate [12,13,22,23]. The relevance of risk perceptions for endorsement of adaptationmea-
sures is less clear [27]. Most studies that investigated risk perceptions explicitly related to cli-
mate change found no relevant (or only a negligible) link with people’s level of adaptation
support [28,29]. This is unexpected, as it conflicts with theoretical work that considers risk per-
ceptions as a crucial factor for people’s motivation to act in response to climate change [30]
and is inconsistent with more general research on hazard preparedness, which typically finds
that risk perceptions are strongly related to people’s willingness to take preventive measures
[31].
Within analytical risk perception another differentiation should be made when dealing with
climate change: that of generalised risks (e.g., to other people) versus the risks that are seen to
be self-relevant to the individual contemplating action. Typically, people estimate the risks to
others to be greater than those to themselves [32], something that can interfere with taking ac-
tion because it deflects personal relevance and responsibility. This type of thinking has also
been highlighted in relation to the risks of climate change: People generally perceive climate
change as a distant threat, something that affects strangers, and that happens in remote times
and places rather than here and now [12,33]. The perception of climate change as a distant
threat could lead to the perspective that climate change risks are irrelevant to the individual
and that there is no need for personal action. Put the other way around, when climate change is
perceived as a phenomenon with proximal consequences, then people should also have a
Public Endorsement of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0124843 April 29, 2015 4 / 17
greater sense of urgency and responsibility, and should ultimately be more motivated to re-
spond to climate change [34–36]. The assumption that proximal risk perceptions should in-
crease people’s willingness to act seems especially relevant with regard to adaptation, given its
predominantly local focus [6,37]. Haden and colleagues [38] provide some empirical evidence
for this assumption. They found that the more farmers were concerned about future local
water availability, the more they were willing to adapt to climate change by adopting new
irrigation practices.
The distinction between proximal and distant risk perceptions also warrants some com-
ments with regard to mitigation. One the one hand, the common assumption that an increased
sense of proximal risks motivates people to mitigate [34,35] makes intuitive sense. On the
other hand, the global scale at which mitigation works [4] suggests that distant risk perceptions
could also be positively linked to endorsement of mitigation, especially among people who are
more concerned about places at a more distant level than they are about proximal places [7].
Consistent with this reasoning, one study found that the more farmers were concerned about
distant climate change, the more they were willing to adopt new mitigation practices [38].
Thus, there are theoretical reasons for and against the superiority of proximal risk perceptions
over distant risk perceptions as a predictor of mitigation support; moreover, some evidence
suggests that distant risk perceptions might be more relevant for motivating mitigation than
proximal risk perceptions.
Summary and Research Aims
An effective response to climate change requires the public to jointly endorse mitigation and
adaptation measures. A key problem with this requirement is that very little research is avail-
able on how the general public relates these two strategies to each other. The main goal of this
research was to assess the general public’s endorsement of different forms of mitigation and ad-
aptation and to relate the levels of endorsement of these measures with each other. To this end
we conducted online surveys in two European countries in which we (1) investigated correla-
tions between different forms of endorsement of mitigation and adaptation and (2) compared
how well social psychological predictor variables accounted for individual differences in en-
dorsement of mitigation and adaptation. This second, more indirect approach of using social
psychological variables as predictors of mitigation and adaptation enabled us to learn more
about how (dis-)similar the reasons for endorsing the two response strategies were.
Methods
Design and Participants
In Spring 2010 we conducted one online survey in the UK and one in Switzerland. (The two
studies were not originally planned and carried out with the intention of comparing them. This
is also the reason why some questions and measures differ between the Swiss survey and the
UK survey). In the UK sample, we recruited participants primarily through advertisements
that were displayed on the websites of two newspapers with an assumed different readership
(“The Daily Mirror” and “The Independent”). Participants were told that the survey was about
current affairs and how they used different media. Participants were then instructed on how to
fill in the questionnaire and about their rights. Informed consent was attained by asking partic-
ipants to only continue if they had read and understood the provided instructions and infor-
mation and if they were willing to participate in our survey. Ethical approval for this study was
granted by the ethics committee of the Psychology Department, University of Exeter; the con-
sent procedure is common practice for online studies and was not explicitly appraised by the
ethics committee
Public Endorsement of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
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After some filler questions participants were assigned an allegedly random topic of current
interest—which was always “climate change”. The survey asked participants about their views
on climate change and concluded with socio-demographic questions (S2 and S3 Tables). The
proportion of females among the 612 participants was 41.5%, and the proportion of males was
45.8% (12.7% did not report their sex). On average, people were 39.3 years old (SD = 13.31;
range: 16 to 83).
In the Swiss survey, we sent an email to people who had participated in a previous research
project on environmental attitudes and pro-environmental behaviour [24] and asked them to
take our online survey. The survey was framed as a follow-up to examine how attitudes and be-
haviours develop over time. The first part of the questionnaire asked participants about their
attitudes towards nature and environmental protection. Next, the survey asked about their
views on climate change and concluded with basic demographic questions. Of the 316 partici-
pants, seven were excluded because they lived in a country other than Switzerland. Of the final
sample, 48.5% were females and 51.5% were males; the sample's mean age was 36.6 years
(SD = 15.2; range: 19 to 81). The data were collected under the affiliation of the University of
Zürich. At the time of our study, the University of Zürich had no standing committee on ethics
and no institutional review board required approval for research in the social sciences. We,
however, certify that this research adheres to the ethical guidelines for research with human
participants of the American Psychological Association [39]. Informed consent was obtained
in the same way as in the UK Study.
Measures
Predictor variables. To assess the degree to which people were sceptical about human-
made climate change, we adopted seven previously used items [21,40] and added an item that
referred to the previous unusually cold winter. Participants were asked to indicate how much
they agreed with these statements (see S1 Table for all items used). The seven items formed a
reliable scale (Cronbach’s α in the UK survey =. 85, Cronbach’s α in the Swiss survey =. 87).
To assess attitude towards environmental protection (Swiss sample), we used a behaviour-
based attitude measure with 50 items [41]. This instrument included 18 items with a yes/no re-
sponse and 32 items with a frequency scale. The 50 items of the environmental attitude mea-
sure formed a reliable scale (α =. 86).
The more general attitude towards nature consisted of 40 items (Swiss sample), of which 26
were presented as behavioural self-reports and 14 as evaluative statements [24]. The 40 items
formed a reliable scale (α =. 84).
In the UK survey we used four items to assess people’s attitude towards addressing climate
change (items taken from [21]). The reliability of this scale was acceptable (α =. 59).
To assess risk perceptions, we asked people to judge the likelihood that seven (identical)
risks [12,22,23] would occur as a consequence of climate change either close to or far away
from where they live. The seven items formed reliable scales both for the proximal (αUK =. 83;
αSwitzerland =. 76) and distant level (αUK =. 90; αSwitzerland =. 83).
In the Swiss survey, we assessed affective risk perception by asking participants about their
emotional reaction when they thought about climate change (1 = very positive, 7 = very nega-
tive; [42]). In the UK survey, participants were first asked if they had any negative feelings
about climate change (1 = none). If they replied with “yes”, they were also asked to rate the de-
gree of their negative feelings (2 = slightly, 5 = extremely).
Dependent measures. To measure participants’ support for mitigation policies, respon-
dents were presented with a selection of steps to decrease the amount of greenhouse gases “as a
society” and then asked how they would vote on them in a national referendum [23]. We
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adapted eight questions—some with slightly different wordings—from the literature [43,44]
and created six new questions. The 14 propositions to mitigate climate change as a collective
formed a reliable scale (αUK =. 90, αSwitzerland =. 89).
Participants were presented with a brief introduction (see S1 Fig) explaining the need and
the rationale underlying the idea of adaptation. To assess support for pro-active adaptation poli-
cies, we developed a catalogue of 15 adaptation measures that were guided by adaptation re-
search [45] and by strategies from large cities [46]. The proposed adaptation measures focused
on conservation of species, protection against water scarcity, heat, and floods. Participants
were told that there were many steps that “we can take as a society to adapt to climate change”
and then asked to indicate how much they would support different adaptation measures. The
15 items formed a reliable scale (αUK =. 89, αSwitzerland =. 83).
We used ten items to assess people’s future intentions to engage in behaviours to mitigate cli-
mate change (UK sample) and asked them how likely they were to take these actions. The top-
ics revolved around mobility, energy saving, consumption, and political behaviours. The
proposed ten actions formed a reliable scale in the UK survey (α =. 78). For lack of space we
could not include this measure in the Swiss survey.
We also presented (UK) participants with eight actions they could individually take to adapt
to climate change impacts. The eight personal behavioural intentions to adapt formed a reliable
scale (α =. 81). (Again, there was no space for these questions in the Swiss survey).
To explore whether our newly developed dependent variables measure one-dimensional
concepts, we conducted a series of exploratory factor analyses. We first ran two principal axis
factoring analyses that included either the personal behavioural intentions to mitigate or to
adapt (since personal behavioural intentions were not assessed in Switzerland, the analyses
were only performed with the UK sample). We then explored (in both samples) the dimension-
ality of the mitigation and adaptation policy support items. All six analyses revealed that the
items were suitable for factor analysis (KMO and Bartlett’s test, S4–S7 Tables). Although the
presence of more than one factor with an eigenvalue larger than one would suggest keeping
several factors according to the Kaiser criterion [47], the eigenvalues of the first factor were
considerably larger than the ones of the second factor (scree plots, S2 Fig). We therefore decid-
ed to retain the anticipated and theoretically more meaningful one-dimensional solutions.
Results
Direct relationships between mitigation and adaptation
The Pearson correlations in Table 1 provide direct information for how people’s willingness to
endorse mitigation and adaptation—either on a personal or societal level—are related. Most
importantly, all correlation coefficients between mitigation and adaptation are positively relat-
ed with medium to large effect sizes (.44 r. 66). The strongest relationships were found be-
tween variables that were on the same level of implementation (either personal or societal):
The correlation between support for mitigation and adaptation policies was r =. 66 in the UK
and r =. 61 in Switzerland. People’s personal behavioural intentions to mitigate climate change
and adapt to its consequences were also strongly correlated r =. 60.
Taken together, the correlation coefficients show that when a person endorses any form of
mitigation—for example introducing new taxes—she is likely to also endorse any other way of
mitigating climate change—for example by using public transport more often—and to endorse
measures to adapt to impacts of climate change (i.e., positive relationship). Of course, this also
means that endorsement of any adaptation measure also entails endorsement of mitigation
measures. This speaks against the idea that people think of mitigation and adaptation as alter-
native or mutually exclusive strategies to respond to climate change.
Public Endorsement of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
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Indirect information about the relationship of public endorsement of
mitigation and adaptation
We built hierarchical regression equations with four different blocks to predict policy support
and personal behavioural intentions in multiple regressions. The first block included the level
of individual scepticism about climate change and either an attitude that specifically related to
addressing climate change (UK) or two more general attitudes related to environmental protec-
tion and nature (Switzerland). The second block consisted of the affective risk perception and
the third block included analytical risk perceptions, which were divided into proximal and dis-
tant risks. These three models were instructive because they allowed us to evaluate the predic-
tive power of each set of predictors and to learn more about how well these specific predictors
can account for the variance in the dependent variable in relation to each other (e.g., when the
focus was to compare proximal vs. distant risk perceptions).
To account for a potential overlap between the predictor variables, we also ran models in
which we included all predictors simultaneously. These full models allowed us to assess the pre-
dictive power of each variable while all other predictors were held constant and to identify the
predictors that best explain the variance in the dependent variable.
Support for mitigation and adaptation policies. Attitudes and sceptical beliefs (Model 1)
did the best job of explaining people’s support for mitigation policies (R2adjusted =. 37 /. 54,
Table 2): The more positive people’s attitude towards nature and the stronger their attitude to
protect the environment (Switzerland) or to address climate change (UK) and the less they
were sceptical about climate change, the more they were willing to support mitigation policies.
(Analytical) risk perceptions (proximal and distant risks) represented the second most power-
ful predictor of mitigation support—as can be seen in the amount of variance explained as a
separate predictor block (R2adjusted =. 29 /. 37, Model 3, Table 2) and the size of their Beta-
weights in the Full Models (Table 2).
When the potential overlap between the predictors was taken into account in the Full Mod-
els (Table 2), scepticism and attitude towards addressing climate change (UK survey) and
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between predictor variables and dependent variables.
MUK / MCH SDUK / SDCH 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Attitude towards nature / 3.39 / 0.58 .47*** -.11 .07 .30*** .26*** .33*** .27***
2 Attitude towards addressing climate
change (UK) / environmental
protection (Switzerland)
3.26 / 3.62 0.70 / 0.50 -.36*** .19** .25*** .36*** .60*** .35***
3 Scepticism 2.45 / 2.04 0.82 / 0.75 -.67*** -.41*** -.32*** -.58*** -.61*** -.41***
4 Affective risk perception 2.50 / 5.49 1.42 / 1.08 .49*** -.52*** .18** .41*** .31*** .22***
5 Local risk perception 3.10 / 2.85 0.72 / 0.63 .44*** -.41*** .39*** .61*** .43*** .36***
6 Global risk perception 3.87 / 3.97 0.74 / 0.62 .53*** -.56*** .44*** .68*** .61*** .54***
7 Mitigation policy support 3.35 / 3.66 0.77 / 0.74 .55*** -.56*** .43*** .45*** .53*** .61***
8 Adaptation policy support 3.69 / 3.48 0.62 / 0.54 .43*** -.44*** .34*** .36*** .48*** .66***
9 Mitigation personal intentions 3.44 / - 0.67 / - .42*** -.41*** .36*** .40*** .44*** .60*** .47***
10 Adaptation personal intentions 2.88 / - 0.78 / - .36*** -.33*** .29*** .38*** .30*** .44*** .42*** .61***
Note. To the right of the means (M) and standard deviations (SD), the ﬁgures below the diagonal refer to the United Kingdom (UK) survey, those above to
the Swiss (CH) survey. As we did not assess personal intentions in the Swiss survey, these cells do not contain any ﬁgures.
*** Stands for p < .001
** stands for p < .01
* stands for p < .05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124843.t001
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attitude towards environmental protection (Swiss survey) independently explained the largest
proportion of variance of support for mitigation policies, followed by distant risk perceptions.
Particularly interesting is the predictive power of people’s attitude towards environmental pro-
tection, which independently explained 13% of the variance in mitigation policy support
(Table 2). This suggests that for many people protecting the environment in general and sup-
porting mitigation policies go hand in hand.
With regard to support for adaptation policies, the attitude and sceptical beliefs block
(R2adjusted =. 22 /. 23, Model 1, Table 2) explained slightly less of the variance than the block
containing risk perceptions (R2adjusted =. 23 /. 28, Model 3). In the Full Model the single most
powerful predictor of support for adaptation policies is distant risk perception: The more
likely people judge climate risks to affect remote places, the more they are willing to support
adaptation policies (Table 2). The role of proximal risk perceptions as a predictor of support
for adaptation policies, however, was negligible.
Personal behavioural intentions to mitigate and to adapt. The model containing atti-
tudes and sceptical beliefs (Model 1, Table 3) and the one featuring analytical risk perceptions
(Model 3, Table 3) both explained 20% of the variance in people’s personal behavioural inten-
tions to mitigate. When directly compared, attitude towards addressing climate change and
sceptical beliefs were equally strong predictors of mitigation intentions (Model 1, Table 3). In
the Full Model, however, the contribution of scepticism to explaining personal behavioural in-
tentions to mitigate was no longer statistically significant. At first glance, this stands in contrast
to the important role sceptical beliefs played as a predictor of mitigation policy support. Yet the
inferiority of the scepticism measure with regard to the statistically significant predictors is
small in terms of the size of the Beta-weights (Δβ. 06).
In contrast to support for mitigation policy, the superiority of distant risk perceptions as a
predictor of personal behavioural intentions to mitigate shrunk in direct comparison to proxi-
mal risk perceptions (Model 3, Table 3) and completely disappeared when the remaining pre-
dictors were added (Full Model, Table 3). In this Full model, all predictors—with the exception
of scepticism—made a statistically significant and a similarly large contribution to explain peo-
ple’s intention to take personal mitigation actions.
When combined in Model 1, attitude towards addressing climate change and scepticism
(R2adjusted =. 14, Table 3) and analytical risk perceptions (R
2
adjusted =. 15, Model 3, Table 3)
equally well predicted personal behavioural intentions to adapt. In the Full Model, proximal
risk perceptions outperformed the other predictors: The perception of (more) proximal risks
was by far the best predictor of people’s willingness to take personal adaptation actions
(Table 3).
The other variables that achieved statistical significance as predictors of personal beha-
vioural intentions to adapt in the Full Model were the degree of people’s scepticism and their
attitudes towards addressing climate change. The less sceptical people were about climate
change and the more positively their attitudes towards addressing climate change, the more
they were ready to take personal adaption actions.
Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusions
Discussion
This study provides consistent evidence from two countries that public endorsement of mitiga-
tion and adaptation are strongly linked to each other and that the two response strategies are
endorsed for similar reasons. People who were willing to mitigate climate change—be it on a
personal level by changing their behaviour or on a societal level by supporting policies—also
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supported personal and societal steps to adapt to negative consequences from climate change,
and vice versa.
It also seems that the psychological processes involved in peoples’motivation to respond to
climate change are very similar for these two strategies: People who believe that climate change
is real, who have positive attitudes about protecting the environment and about addressing cli-
mate change, and who perceive climate change as a risk, are willing to endorse both mitigation
and adaptation strategies.
The finding that surprised us most, and that opens new avenues for future research, con-
cerns the relationship between risk perceptions and the level at which response strategies are
implemented. A common idea is that people are not willing to address climate change because
they perceive it as a distant threat and that their motivation could be increased by making local
consequences more salient [34,35]. If “localising” is an effective means to increase individual
engagement with climate change, as is often expected, then proximal risk perceptions should
outperform distant risk perceptions as a predictor for every dependent variable. However, it
was distant risk perceptions that better predicted people’s willingness to support mitigation
and adaptation policies rather than proximal risk perceptions (Table 2). Neither was proximal
risk perception superior in terms of personal behavioural intentions to mitigate (Table 3); both
proximal and distant risk perceptions uniquely contributed to the prediction of personal beha-
vioural intentions. It was only with regard to personal adaptation intentions that we found the
expected superiority of proximal risk perceptions as a predictor.
Construal Level Theory [48], a dominant theory in the current psychological literature, pro-
vides a possible explanation for the unexpected associations between proximal risks and per-
sonal behavioural intentions as well as between distant risks and policy support. Construal
Level Theory posits that human perceptions of the world and the way individuals make judg-
ments depend on the psychological distance between the self and the events or objects being
dealt with. Low psychological distance means that we are focused on ourselves, our current
geographic location, and the present time. Conversely, when psychological distance is high,
then we focus on other people, faraway places and the distant future or past.
The variables we used to assess analytical risks and willingness to respond to climate change
neatly map onto two dimensions of psychological distance: Proximal and distant risk percep-
tions can be mapped onto the dimension of spatial distance; personal behavioural intentions
and policy support can be mapped onto the social dimension of psychological distance (I vs.
we do something). Perhaps the unexpected strong relationships we found between proximal
risk perceptions and personal behavioural intentions on the one hand, and between distant risk
perceptions and policy support on the other hand, are due to spontaneous matches with regard
to psychological distance. Proximal risk perceptions are psychologically proximal on the spatial
dimension and personal behavioural intentions can be regarded as proximal on the social di-
mension (it is the individual who forms the intentions). Likewise, the spatially remote distant
risk perceptions can be matched to support for policies, which can be regarded as distant on
the social dimension (policies involve strangers and collective action). Importantly, the pro-
posed spontaneous matches would be consistent with the empirically corroborated proposition
of Construal Level Theory saying that different dimensions of psychological distance (e.g., so-
cial and spatial distance) are related to each other [48]. To some extent this proposition has
also been observed with regard to people’s perception of climate change [36]. It is therefore
plausible that the observed links between the risk perspective and level of implementation are
due to a similar level of psychological distance from the individual and, therefore, due to a cor-
responding level of mental construal.
This Construal Level Theory interpretation of our findings resembles the proposition that
mitigation and adaptation strategies are in themselves linked to specific construal levels. Haden
Public Endorsement of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0124843 April 29, 2015 12 / 17
and colleagues (2012) argued that because mitigation is a collective problem that requires glob-
al action (i.e., involving greater spatial and social distance), this strategy is represented more
abstractly than adaptation, which instead deals with local problems that directly affect the indi-
vidual (i.e., involving less spatial and social distance). Our findings add to this literature by
showing that the distinction of personal versus societal responses to climate change may be
helpful to understand how different aspects of psychological distance affect endorsement of
mitigation and adaptation strategies.
The Construal Level Theory perspective leads to some counter-intuitive corollaries that are
relevant for climate change communication. The relationships we observed between spatially
varying risk perspectives and the two levels of implementation imply that appeals to change
personal behaviour and to increase support for policies are most effective when they are com-
bined with spatial information that is consistent with their respective construal. This logic is
consistent with the reasoning of Construal Level Theory and with empirical findings on the ef-
fectiveness of matching construal levels [49]. The importance of matching levels could also ex-
plain why previous attempts to increase people’s engagement with climate change by
portraying proximal impacts (i.e., low-level construal) were not successful in increasing sup-
port for policies and strengthening attitudes towards climate change mitigation (both high-
level construals [50,51]). In short, on the basis of our results and current theory, we suggest
that a proximal focus does not per se lead to more involvement and stronger motivation to act
on climate change (for a similar argument, see [36]). Rather, climate change communication
could be much more effective if different levels of construals are intentionally matched: Focus-
sing people’s attention on local climate change seems well suited to enhance their willingness
to take personal actions, probably more so if these actions are related to adaptation [38]. How-
ever, with regard to support for policies it seems more effective to address the issue of climate
change on a bigger scale and therefore remove climate change spatially from people rather
than bring it closer to them [51], especially if these policies concern mitigation [38].
Limitations and directions for future research
At least three limitations might have affected the findings of this research. The first issue we
would like to discuss is the small amount of variance affective risk perception could explain
with regard to the dependent variables. However, we believe that the weak predictive power of
affective risk does not indicate that this variable is irrelevant as a motivation to address climate
change (see also the successful use of affect in previous studies [12,42]). Instead, we believe that
this weakness reflects the potential for methodical improvement, such as including several
items rather than a single-item question.
Second, our samples were not representative of either the UK or Switzerland. However,
given the moderate size of the samples (N = 616 / 309) and given that the participants in the
two samples cover a broad range of socio-demographic characteristics (S2 and S3 Tables), we
are confident that our samples are diverse enough to study relationships between different so-
cial-psychological variables. We also think that given the different recruiting strategies and
considering that survey contexts were markedly different, the highly similar results from the
two samples speak of the external validity of our findings. However, without a more represen-
tative sample, we do not know whether our findings are limited to persons who are younger
and comparatively better educated.
The third shortcoming of this research has to do with the selection of predictor variables.
Although we included a variety of psychological processes to study similarities and differences
between endorsement of mitigation and adaptation, there are other potentially relevant vari-
ables—for example, the extent to which people believe that the proposed measures will be
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effective (i.e., efficacy beliefs [28,30,52]) and see themselves as personally capable of responding
to climate change (i.e., self-efficacy beliefs [30,35,52]. Other relevant processes might include
perceived costs of responses [52], experience with the effects of climate change [35], or beliefs
and opinion of relevant others [28]. Studying these alternative predictors of endorsement of
mitigation and adaptation could reveal that the motives to mitigate and to adapt vary more
strongly than suggested by our findings.
Conclusions
In responding to climate change, mitigation and adaptation go hand in hand—not just in pleas
from the scientific community but also in people’s minds. Yet, sometimes one hand is needed
more than the other. The better the understanding of how to mobilise each hand to do specific
things, for example by focussing on proximal risk perceptions to foster the willingness to take
personal adaptation actions and by appealing to existing attitudes to increase support for miti-
gation policies, the more effective responses to the challenges of climate change will be.
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